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1.  lmpl~mentation of the third  packag~ of air transport measures adopted by the Council has 
already  intensified competition  in  air transport to  some extent.  For the full  benefit of 
liberalization  to  be  felt,  however, there will  also have to be new rules of play applying 
th~ principles of competition  to  activities ancillary  to  air transport  proper.  Such, for 
example, was the a11n of the proposal for a Community code of conduct for computerized 
reservation systems. 
2.  The provision of ground handling services  l~llls into this category.  Since liberalization, 
Community airlines have been able to opcrak on an open market, but if they are to seize 
all  the opportunities afforded by  this new envlfCmmcnt they must be better able to control 
their prices, costs and the quality of services supplied. Ground handling is  a substantial 
factor in  airlines' operating costs.  (iround handling is also an important aspect of  the way 
in  which airlines seck  to difli:rentiate the image they  present to customers.  Carriers are 
therefore anxious to  have  the  freedom  to  choose between several  suppliers of different 
services, or to provide their own services. 
Certain airports might also be interested in  differentiating their image from other airports 
to  the extent that  they  compete for  part of the traffic.  Those aspects are of relevance, 
however,  primarily  in  relation  to  air  carriers  as  users  of the  airports.  They  are  less 
important  in  relation  to  the  passengers,  for  which  carriers  compete  in  a  Iiberati  sed 
environment. 
.l.  The  large  numher  of complaints  received  by  the  Commission  in  recent  months  is 
evidence  of the  existence  of  problems  in  this  sector.  The  continued  existence  of 
monopolies or undertakings with special or exclusive rights in  a number of Community 
airports indicates that ground handling services arc atypical of the liberalized air transport 
market.  Moreover,  the  ('om  mission  granted  a  block  exemption  for  certain types of 
agreement between  undertakings in  this sector under Article 85(3) of the  EEC Treaty. 
The exemption ex pi red at the end of I 992, and it is now necessary to set up a framework 
that  will  regulate <md  organize the  market for  ground handling services in  accordance 
with  the principles of competition. 
IJ.  J>fGS~flt  st~tl,as pf  th~ grqynd hctndling marke_t 
Gro~m  __ q haiid!ing  sc~vices 
4.  "Ground handling services"  arc  all  the  services  supplied at  an  airport for the  aircraft 
itself,  the  passengers  and  the  cargo.  They  arc  very  varied  and  do  not  form  a 
homogeneous whole.  They may be subdiv1ded into eleven major categories on the basis 
of Annex A  to  the  I ATA  standard  ground  handling agreement (the  references  are  l<'l 
sections of that  Agreement); 
( 1  )  Ground adm in1stration and supervision (Sections  I,  2,  3 and 13) 
( 2)  Passenger handling (Section iJ,  excepting 4.4) 
(3)  Baggage handling (Section 4 1 1) 
(!J)  Cargo <Uld  mail  handling (Section  5) 
(5)  Ramp services (Section (J) 
((,)  Cleaning (Section  7) 
(7)  Fuelling (Scct1on  K) 
(H)  Aircraft maintenance (Section 9) 
(lJ)  Flight operations and crew admi111stration  (Section  I 0) 
(10)  Surface transport (Section  II) (II) Catering services (Section  12). 
-~-
Sit1,1~t!o.n .in.  ~irpo_rt~ 
5.  The supply of ground handling services differs from  one airport to  another, and even 
from  one terminal  to  another  within  the  same airport.  It is  nevertheless possible  to 
pinpoint certain general  patterns. 
In  a  number  of Community  airports,  ground  handling  is  only  partially  open  to 
competition: 
in  many  cases the  airport or the national  carrier operates a  monopoly or duopoly; 
in  addition, carriers arc not always allowed to perform their own handling services. 
Airlines arc thus not always able to  choose between competing suppliers; suppliers have 
a  margin of discretion to set prices that arc barely transparent, at levels which may not 
effectively  reflect their costs, or wh1ch  exceed those which  would result from  the free 
interaction  of supply  and  demand.  Furthermore,  the  lack  of competition  and  the 
restrictions on carriers providing their own services could prevent carriers from improving 
the quality of services or matching them to the specitic needs of their customers.  Lastly, 
service  suppliers  holding  a  monopoly  can  in  practice  favour  certain  carriers  to  the 
detriment of others:  the risk  is even greater where monopoly suppliers are themselves 
carriers, as is sometimes the case,  and hence direct competitors of the airlines that are 
f(lrced  to  use their services. 
6.  Very  likely  the  optimum  degree of market  openness  will  not  be  identical  in  all  the 
airports in  question. It is  in  particular in  the large airports that the problems of choice 
affect the largest number of consumers and potential suppliers.  It is  also in the busiest 
airports that the problems of discrimination against new suppliers are liable to arise most 
frequently.  And it  is  probably in  these large airports that liberalization is least likely to 
encounter practical obstacles. 
7.  In  addition, the supply of ground handling services is subject to a number of constraints, 
chief among which arc the fi.lllowlllg. 
Available capacity and space in  airports:  This constraint essentially concerns the 
space· available  i~  terminals  and  ramp  areas,  which  may  be  inadequate  for  the 
personnel and technical equipment required to supply the services concerned.  Lack 
of space  can  also  affect  the  infrastructures  needed  to  supply  services  such  as 
passenger check  in  desks, or the  central area for sorting and dispatching baggage 
to terminals. 
Security  <md  safety:  This is  a constraint imposed by  the need for identity checks 
on persons with  access to  areas that arc closed to the public and sensitive from the 
standpoint of airport security (the security aspect), and the need to coordinate and 
supervise all  operations so as  to  prevent accidents (the safety aspect).  The latter 
aspect  i~·  partly linked to  the problem of lack of space referred to above. 
Technical feasibility  The provision of some handling services means that suppliers 
must  have  access  to  certain  equipment  <md  certain  infrastructures.  Constraints 
caused by  technical  feasibility  may  thus  affect the supply of particular services. 
These  constraints  arc  not  related  to  problems  of capacity,  but  they  may  be 
aggravated by  a lack of space  The need to coordinate or indeed centralize certain 
functions may constitute a  major constraint, in  particular as regards the utilization 
of facilities and infrastructures. .1 
lnvt:slnH.:nl  costs.  In  sOllll~  c<~ses,  the  only  way  of'  alleviating  or  removing  the 
constraints caused by  lack or capacity and space and by  the need for coordination 
is through  considerabk~ investment, on the part of both the service supplier and the 
airport itself.  This fact  may  in  certain cases militate against liberalization of  certain 
services in  the short term, or make it  necessary to  restrict its extent. 
The question of the necessity for  an  airport to guarantee a minimum transfer time might 
also be examined in  particular cases 
It is  essential to  take account of all  these constraints to  ensure that the ground handling 
services provided in  airports arc efficient.  Such constraints can have a significant impact 
on the overall capacity of airports, which  can  in  turn  restrict the scope for opening up 
these services to competition. 
The constraints do not affect  all  types of services to  the same degree.  They may  also 
differ from one airport to  another, and occasionally from one terminal to another within 
the same airport. 
R.  The current situation  therefore requires that  the  market in  ground handling services be 
reorganized and opened  up  to  competition, the  principal  objective being to guarantee 
quality  services and  an  acceptable level  of prices for  all  interested parties.  This will 
mean: 
avoiding discriminatory  practices observed  at certain  airports  and distortions of 
competition between carriers which such practices may engende. 
preventing similar situations recurring in  future. 
The means to  this end arc twofold. 
(I)  The  market  should  be  opened  up  by  removing  the  current dJLiure  and  de facto 
restrictions, so as to  establish free access to the market by  service suppliers. 
(2)  This process should be accompanied by  framework measures laying down minimum 
rules f(lr  Member States, airports and service suppliers to ensure that access to the 
market  remains open  and  that  the  market works  in  accordance  with  competitive 
principles.  Such measures would in  no way  preclude national  rules intended for 
example to guarantee sound management of infrastructures and to maintain safety 
and security.  National  rules would nevertheless have to comply with Community 
law. 
Opening up the  m~n'ki~t 
9.  (iiven  the  wide  variety  of services  involved,  not  all  ground  handling  services  need 
necessarily be covered by the same arrangements for liberalizing the market:  for practical 
reasons, some types of service arc better suited for complete liberalization than others. 
A  differentiated approach  designed to  liberalize some types of service completely and 
others partially  is  probably  better geared  to  the  characteristics of the various types of 
service, to  user requirements and to  constraints at airports. 
l>e~r~es of libentlizntion 
1  0  As regards the various degrees of liberalization, the following options can be envisaged. 
(I)  Complete liberalization would require the abolition of all exclusive or special rights 
and of legal  restrictions on  !'he  freedom of airlines to provide their own services. 4 
Competition  would  be  g1ven  a  free  re111,  the  number of suppliers  would  not  be 
limited. !l"d self supply would he allowed without restriction. 
(2)  A  more  limited  f(lfm  or  liberalization  would  involve  the  partial  elimination of 
current restrictions and the authorization of a limited number of suppliers, at least 
one of whom should be independent, i.e. not controlled directly or indirectly by  the 
airport  itself or by  the  dominant  carrier (a carrier accounting  for  more than  a 
certain percentage of the airport's trafftc).  Authorized suppliers would be selected 
by  tender. 
This  partial  liberalization  would  be  accompanied  by  the  complete  removal  of 
restrictions on carriers providing their own services.  Each airline would therefore 
have a  choice between  providing its  own  services and using those of authorized 
suppliers, at least one of whom would be  independent. 
I 1.  The optimum degree to  which  the various services should be opened up  to competition 
can be determined by  reference to a number of criteria. 
Some  services  are  in  more  immediate  contact  with  passengers  themselves  and 
influence the image of an  airline in  the eyes of the travelling public.  These are, 
principally: 
passsengcr handling: 
baggage handling: 
catering, and 
~leaning. 
These are services where there may  be the strongest arguments for opening up the 
market completely, since it is essential f(lr  airlines to be able to control the quality 
of the  service  and,  in  order to  do  this,  to  have as  much  freedom  as  possible in 
choosing their supplier. 
(2)  T~~hni~l!l.v()ffiP.!~.?<i_ty 3;nd cost of investment 
Some  services,  such  as  ground  administration  and  superv•s•on,  do  not  require 
considerable investment  hy  the supplier nor are they  very  technical  in  character. 
Others, however, do fall  into this category, e.g. fuelling  and aircraft maintenance. 
In  the  case  of very  technical  or  capital-intensive  services,  few  candidates  will 
pmbahly  respond  to  market  liberalization  moves.  Complete  liberalization  is 
theref(>re  less necessary. 
P)  C<\m~~ity an9  spacc_avail~bl_t; 
At  many airports. the capacity of the mstallations, especially terminals, may  limit 
the number of service suppliers that can  be accommodated in  practice. There are 
two aspects to this difficulty 
virtually  all  handling services may  be affected since the  supplier's physical 
presence at the airport will almost always be necessary, at least intermittently; 
the  only  exceptions seem  to  be ground administration  and supervision and 
flight operations and crew administration, which require very  little space; the degree of diiTiwlty III<Jy  differ completely from one airport to another and 
even from  one terminal  to  another. 
On the basis of the informal ton available to the Commission it is hard at present to 
judge what the real  impact is  111  each  case. 
Another  rn;~jor  problem  associated  with  this  constraint  is  the  investment which 
opening up  the market  may  require of the airport itself, and not just of the service 
suppliers.  While it is reasonable that a supplier should bear the costs of providing 
services at an airport. it  is  less obvious that airports should be forced to undertake 
the sometimes considerable investment  that  accommodating new suppliers might 
require.  Service suppliers could therefore be invited to contribute in some way to 
the financing of such investment, e.g. through the rents, charges and fees, etc. which 
they are asked to  pay  in  return for access to the infra<;tructure. 
( 4)  S~fety an_d  secwity 
In  cerlatn  cases,  safely  and security  requirements  may  also  limit  the  number of 
suppliers of certain services that can  be accommodated.  This is  particularly so in 
t~e case of: 
services which  involve  direct access by  staff to  the aircraft or to  sensitive 
areas, such as catering, cleaning or aircraft maintenance; 
. services involving the movement of vehicles in  mixed areas where aircraft are 
also present, e.g.  ramp services or fuelling. 
Strictly speaking, this means only  that the airport should have the power to check 
the  id0ntity of persons having access to  the aircraft and to  sensitive areas, and to 
make sure that staff and vehicles comply with the necessary traffic and coordination 
rules.  This docs not seem automatically incompatible with opening up the market, 
provided that  increasing the  number of suppliers docs not  make it impossible in 
practice to carry  out such checks and  coordination mea<;ures.  It will  therefore be 
necessary  to  find  a  compromise  which  will  achieve  the  highest  degree  of 
libcralil'.ation compatible with maintaining the level of  safety and security necessary. 
12.  These  considerations  suggest  that  the  best  candidate  for  complete  liberalization  is  a 
servtce: 
which is  close to  the  pass~.~nger, 
which  involves little cost and is  technically straightforward; 
where security and safety constraints arc not prominent, and 
which is not likely  to  be  affected by  a  lack of space or capacity. 
The ideal  example is  passenger handling. 
( 'onverscly. the worst candidate for complete liberalization is a service: 
where there is  no  contact with  passengers; 
which is  technically complex or involves a high level of investment; 
where there arc acute problems of safety or security, and 
where available capacity or space is  likely  to be limited. A typ1cal  l!Xampll!  would be fuelling or ramp services. 
_.,ntmt.~woa'k measua~s 
IJ.  The framework  measures  include a  number which  are  likely  to  be  applied across the 
board despite the variety of situations encountered.  The main ones are as follows. 
(I)  "Unbundling", would separate the functions of airport manager and service supplier. 
All  ground  handling  services  arc  supplied,  by  definition,  at  an  airport,  whose 
infrastructure is  used by  the service suppliers.  The body  reponsible for managing 
the airport can, therefore, through its decisions, significantly influence competition 
between  the  various  suppliers of ground  handling  services.  It is  consequently 
essential to  ensure that it  remains impartial with regard to them. 
At  present,  the  mana~ing bodies of several  airports arc  also  suppliers of ground 
handling services, under various amutgements which range from a straightforward 
monopoly to a holding in a specialist company.  Competition between suppliers can 
be distorted by  this duality of roles. 
Four types of measure can be taken  in  order to contain this risk: 
(a)  unbundling of accounts 
this would oblige airports to differentiate in  their cost accounting between 
airport management activities and ground handling services; 
(b)  management unbundling 
in  addition  to  unbundled  accounts,  this  level  reqmres  separate 
management  for  the  two  activities  (e.g.  a  company  with  two  separate 
divisions); 
(c)  legal  unbundling 
this requires, in  addition to  (b), that the two  activities be carried out by 
bodies with separate legal  personality; 
(d)  total  unbundling 
this  would,  in  addition  to  (c),  prohibit any  economic links between the 
·two legal  persons. 
"Total  unbundlin~" would avoid all  contlicts of interest;  it  would require airports 
to sell off their ground handling d1visions.  But at the present time the two activities 
arc vertically integrated in  many airports, and total unbundling could cause practical 
and  legal  difficulties  which  might  be  quite  serious  in  some  cases.  "Legal 
unbundling",  which  docs  not present  such  difficulties,  appears sufficient for the 
present purpose. 
(2)  Where a service was not opened up to competition, and continued as a  monopoly 
under the exemption clause described in  point  15(3) below, measures could be taken 
to  ensure  transparency  in  the  prices  charged  for  the  service,  and  to  establish 
machinery  for  compulsory consultation between the service supplier and carriers. 
There might also be a conciliation procedure to deal  with disputes. 
(3)  Where the  market was fully  open to  competition, procedures could be laid down 
under  which  the  airport would  have  to  give approval to  service suppliers.  This 7 
should  not  b~ a  discriminatory  pow~r: any  requirements imposed would  have to 
comply with a number of principles in  order to avoid any  unfairness: 
they  would have to  be non  cllscriminatory: 
they  would have to  be suited to the purpose in  view; 
they  could not  Impose constraints or costs on  service suppliers which were 
out of proportion to  the gains in  effectiveness, safety or security which they 
were likely  to  produce; 
they  could  not  have the  eiTect  of reducing  market openness below a  level 
authorized by  the Community legislation. 
(I\)  Public  tendering  procedures  could  b~  ~stablished  at  Community  level  for  the 
designation  of successful  candidates  wher~ the  market could not be opened fully 
and the number of suppliers had to  be  limited. 
Such  procedures would  have  the  advantage of preventing any  collusion  between 
certain service suppliers and the managing body or any favouritism on the managing 
body's part. 
(5)  There  ar~ pnnciples which ought to  govern any  requirements imposed on service 
suppliers by  the airport.  Whether or not the market is fully  open to competition, 
the airport authority or corporation. as the body managing and regulating the airport, 
must be entitled to  take the measures necessary for efficient management and for 
security  and safety  It must  be able  to  require service suppliers at  the airport to 
comply  with  the  rules and  conditions it  considers appropriate for  these purposes. 
But  such  meusurcs  should  comply  with  the  same  principles  as  those  listed  in 
point (J) 
A  binding code of conduct  might  incorporate  some of the  framework  measures just 
mentioned. 
14.  The liberalization measures envisaged here c<)uld  have repercussions on employment in 
ground handling services: 
as  competition  became effective,  that  is  to  say  when  new service  suppliers  had 
acquired sufficient market share to  exercise real  pressure on  the conduct of firms 
which currently enjoy a monopoly or face only a low level of competition, existing 
firms might be forced to seck productivity gains, and this could result in job losses; 
the new service sup  pi iers, on  th~ other hand, would create new jobs; and airlines 
would see an  improvement in  the quality-·price ratio for ground handling services, 
which would reduce their operating costs, and could have a positive effect on their 
employment policies, particularly in  the difficult period they are going through at 
present. 
These social consequences will  have to  be properly considered during the consultations, 
bearing in  mind that problems of adjustment which  might be easily resolved in a period 
of rapid growth can  be  more serious in  a period where the economy is depressed. 
In  the long term the liberalization of the market in  ground handling services should not 
in  principle  result  in  a  reduction  in  overall  employment or a  worsening of working 
conditions. 
1  ).  The Commission accordingly takes the view that there is a need for a reorganization of the  market  m  ground  handling  serv1ces.  Such  a  reorganization  might  comprise the 
following. 
(I)  The market in  ground handling services could be opened up by fully liberalizing all 
services which come into some sort of contact with the user, or which are subject 
to  only  minor  constraints of cost.  safety  and security,  or available  capacity  and 
space.  There  would  be  no  limit  to  the  number of service  suppliers,  and  airlines 
would be free to provide their own ground handling services without restriction; this 
arrangement would in any event apply to ground administration and supervision and 
to  flight  operations  and  crew  administration,  where  there  are  practically  no 
constraints of the  kind just referred  to,  and to passenger handling, which directly 
affects the image of the airline in  the eyes of the travelling public.  Cleaning, cargo 
and mail handling and catering might also be fully liberalized, but the Commission 
wis~es to  consult interested parties before deciding its position on this point. 
(2)  Those categories of service in  which the contact element is absent, or in which there 
are practical  constraints which  stand in  the way of a  full  opening of the market, 
could be partially liberalized.  Here there would be a minimum number of service 
suppliers, the number being determined in  the light of the consultation process; one 
supplier at  least  would  be  independent  both  of the  airport and of the dominant 
carrier, and airlines would be free to  provide their own services.  This arrangement 
would apply to the types of service where problems of safety and security are most 
serious, such as  ramp services and other activities which involve the movement of 
staff and vehicles in  the immediate neighbourhood of aircraft.  It would also apply 
to  categories  such  as  baggage  handling,  where  a  high  level  of coordination or 
indeed  centralization  is  usually  needed,  if only  because  of the  scale  of  the 
investment undertaken  by  the airport itself 
(3)  Exemptions could he  granted to  airports where there were objective and specific 
constraints which made the opening up of the market difficult to achieve in practice. 
What form such exemptions should take. their extent and limits and the machinery 
for  granting them are matters which  would have to be decided  in  the light of the 
consultation process.  Wherever a service was declared exempt, and was not opened 
up  to  competition, there  would  in  any  event have to  be absolute transparency in 
respect of such aspects as price determination. 
(  4)  Binding rules could be laid down comprising in  particular the following. 
(a)  "Legal unbundling" of airports would allow openness in  the decisions taken 
by  the body  managing the airport, to  curb any discrimination or abuse on its 
part in  its dealings with  service suppliers. 
(b)  t•rocedures  could  be  established  for  the  approval  by  the  airport of service 
suppliers wishing to  provide one or more categories of service which were 
fully  liberalized  at  that  airport.  The  airport  would  be  entitled  to  impose 
mquirements "needed  f(H the proper management of the infrastructure and for 
the  preservation  of  safety  and  security.  These  requirements  would 
nevertheless have to  comply with a number of fundamental principles 
I hey  would have to  be  non -discriminatory 
they  would have to  be suited to the purpose in  view 
they  would have to  he in  proportion to  that purpose 
they  could  not  reduce  the openness of the market to  a  point below 
what was required by  Community legislation. 
(c)  Impartial tendering procedures could be laid down at Community level for the 
designation  of suppliers  of services  wherever  their  number  was  limited. 
These procedures could be based on the Community legislation on the award 
of public contracts. .. 
(d)  The body  manng1ng the airport could he entitled to  take measures or impose 
requirements necessary  for  the proper management of infrastructures and  in 
the  interests of safely  ;md  security  Such  measures or requirements would 
apply  to  all  service suppliers l(lr the entire time they operated at the airport 
They  would have to  comply with  the principles listed at point (b)  above. 
(e)  There should he transparent, objective and non  discriminatory conditions for 
access  to  airport  property  and  plant  by  service  suppliers  and  by  airlines 
wishing to  perform their own ground handling services. 
(t)  Machinery should be set up for consultation and conciliation between airports, 
carriers and suppliers of services, to  deal particularly  with 
disputes concerning  rent,  charges, etc.  imposed on  service suppliers 
by  the airport authority  for access to and use of infrastructures; 
changes in  the  prices of services for  which  the airport has secured 
exemption in  accordance with point 3 above, so that it is not required 
to  open them  up  to  competition. 
(5)  These measures would apply to  airports and airport systems  recording no less than 
2 million passenger movements or 50 000 tonnes of cargo a year. 
"'  *  • 